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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C.,
135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
Synopsis
A woman made a complaint to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Mach Mining, LLC (Mach)
had refused to hire her as a coal minor because of her sex. The
EEOC is required to make an attempt at conciliation to end the
discriminatory conduct prior to filing suit. Mach claimed that the
efforts for conciliation by the EEOC were not made in good faith.
The EEOC argued that the two letters it sent show sufficient efforts,
and that their efforts are not subject to judicial review. The federal
district court ruled that the court could review the EEOC’s
conciliation efforts. The Seventh circuit reversed the district court’s
decision, saying that the conciliation efforts were unreviewable.
The Court granted cert. and reasoned that Congress had created a
“mandatory duty” for the EEOC to try for conciliation prior to filing
suit. Courts regularly enforce this type of prerequisite.
Background
The EEOC investigated a sex discrimination claim made against
Mach. This case involved a woman who filed a complaint with the
EEOC, alleging that she was not hired as a coal minor because of her
sex. The EEOC must try to amend the illegal employment practices
prior to filing suit for employment discrimination under Title VII of


Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2015).
Id. at 1649.
 Id. at 1647.
 Id.
 Id.
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1647 (2015).
Id. at 1651.
Id. at 1647.
Id. at 1650.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mach was invited to “participate in
informal conciliation proceedings” and notified that an EEOC
representative would come to start the process. A total of two
letters were sent to Mach, but the record did not show any other
attempts by the EEOC for conciliation. A year after the first letter
was sent, the EEOC brought suit against Mach in federal district
court. Mach claims that the EEOC did not approach the
conciliation process in good faith before filing suit. The EEOC
claimed that its conciliation attempts were not subject to judicial
review and that the two letters it sent were sufficient proof of its
attempts regardless of review. The federal district court determined
that it had the ability to review whether the EEOC’s efforts were
adequate. The Seventh circuit reversed the district court’s
decision.
It reasoned that the conciliation efforts were
unreviewable because the provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 “entrusts conciliation ‘solely to the EEOC’s expert
judgment’” and does not provide a standard for any judicial review.
Analysis and Ruling
The Court reasoned that Congress does not usually prevent courts
from “enforcing directives to federal agencies.” There is a “strong
presumption” in favor of such judicial review when administrative
actions are in question. The presumption of judicial review is
rebuttable if it is seen that Congress intended for the agency to be
self-policing, but it is difficult for the agency to prove that it was



Id. at 1647.
Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1647 (2015).
 Id. at 1650.
 Id.
 Id.
 Id.
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2015).
 Id. at 1647.
 Id. at 1650.
 Id. at 1651.
 Id.
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designed to self police its actions. The Court then affirmed the
mandatory duty of the EEOC to make a concerted effort to facilitate a
conciliation agreement and to only file suit once the efforts have
absolutely failed. The enforcement of prerequisites for similar Title
VII claims is commonly left to the Court. Representatives of the
EEOC made the argument that no standard criteria had been
established to review the efforts of the EEOC towards conciliation.
However, the Court affirmed its view that, although the EEOC has
discretion as to how conciliation is attempted, Congress has not
allowed the EEOC to have no review. The statute did establish
enough criteria in order to judge whether there has been satisfaction
of the prerequisites. The criteria under §2000e-5(b) includes
“concrete standards,” which show that the endeavor to conciliation
must include informal communication, conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.
The parties’ second dispute revolved around what scope of
judicial review the Court should afford the EEOC.
The
Government argued that, if there is to be some form of judicial
review, that the courts only rely on the “facial examination” of
provided EEOC documents. Mach argued that there should be a
very intrusive review, similar to the way judges oversee bargaining
between unions and employers. The Court decided that there
should be a middle ground standard that still allows the EEOC
discretion in how to carry out the conciliation process but ensures
that the employer is given a chance to “discuss and rectify” any
practice that is discriminatory. If an employer provides evidence in
an affidavit that the EEOC did not make a good faith effort towards



Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015).



Id.
Id.




Id.
Id. at 1652.
 Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1652 (2015).
 Id. at 1653.
 Id.
 Id.
 Id.
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conciliation, then the court must look at the facts of the case.
Otherwise, a sworn affidavit from the EEOC that states that it has
fulfilled its obligations and conciliation efforts failed will be
sufficient proof for the court that the conciliation attempt
requirements are met.
Impact
The Court in this case refused to blindly give Chevron deference
to the EEOC in this case. This reestablished that Chevron deference
is given on a case-by-case basis with the intent of Congress
considered for each agency. The EEOC is still given a large amount
of discretion and its efforts of conciliation are granted flexibility.
However, employers will now have more of a change to defend itself
in a suit if it does not believe that it was given enough of a change for
conciliation efforts to be completed.
Mellouli v. Lynch,
135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015)
Synopsis
This case concerns the Petitioner, Moones Mellouli, who was
convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia used to conceal a
controlled substance under Kansas’s law. After finishing his
probationary period, Immigration and Customs Enforcement decided
that the conviction was cause for removal of Mellouli from the U.S.
He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) who
confirmed the deportation. The Eighth Circuit denied Mellouli’s
petition of review and he was deported in 2012. The BIA’s
argument for deportation was that §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) allowed
deportation for drug offenses under state laws that related to federal
drug and drug paraphernalia laws, even if the actual conduct did not


Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1655 (2015).
Id.
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1981 (2015); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–
5709(b)(2).
 Id. at 1982, 1984.
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fall under the definitions of controlled substances and drug
paraphernalia under §802, so long as the state laws overlapped with
the federal law. The Court found that a narrower interpretation of
the term “relating to” should be used. Without a narrower view,
even minor drug offenses that are not criminalized by federal law and
defined by federal law as qualifying for deportation could cause an
alien to be treated harshly under the law and removed. The Court,
therefore, reversed the prior ruling and determined that Mellouli’s
deportation was incorrect.
Background
Mellouli emigrated from Tunisia on a student visa in 2004 and
was educated in the U.S., later becoming a teacher at the University
of Missouri–Columbia.
He became a conditional permanent
resident in 2009 and was made a lawful resident in 2011. However,
in 2010, Mellouli was arrested for the offenses of driving with a
suspended license and under the influence. Officers found four
orange pills in his sock during the search incident to his arrest.
Mellouli later identified the pills as Adderall, which is a controlled
substance under Kansas state law and federal law. He was charged
with possession of drug paraphernalia and pled guilty to driving
under the influence. It was alleged in the complaint that he had
“use[d] or possess[ed] with intent to use drug paraphernalia . . . [and]
introduce[d] into the human body a controlled substance.” Two
years later, in February 2012, Mellouli had finished his probation.
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers then arrested



Id. at 1982.
Id.
 Id.
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2015).
 Id. at 1984-85.
 Id. at 1985.
 Id.
 Id.
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015)
 Id.
 Id.
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Mellouli and determined that he qualified for deportation because of
his conviction under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The deportation was
ordered by an immigration judge, the BIA affirmed the ruling, and
Mellouli was deported in 2012. The Eighth Circuit court denied the
petition for review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Analysis and Ruling
The Court ruled that Mellouli’s conviction in Kansas under Kan.
Stat. Ann. §21-5709(b)(2) did not trigger the deportation. Under 8
U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i), an alien may be removed if they are
“convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the
United states, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance.” The substances that qualify are defined in §802 of Title
21. Although the Kansas offense was related to possession of a
controlled substance, that law did not require the substance to be
defined in 21 U.S.C §802. However, Mellouli concealing the
controlled substance in his sock would not be considered a drug
paraphernalia offense under federal law because federal law
considers the sale or commerce of drugs and drug paraphernalia to be
criminal not only possession of the contraband.
The Court first addressed the reasoning used by the BIA and
Eighth Circuit to differentiate a possession and distribution offense
from a drug paraphernalia offense. A conviction under state law
can only trigger removal of the alien if the crime is considered a
removable offense under federal law. The facts of the crime that



Id.
Id.
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015).
 Id. at 1984.
 Id.
 Id. at 1985
 Id. (The court continued to explain that drug paraphernalia under federal law
does not include “common household or ready to wear items like socks” and
instead looks for items chiefly intended for use in drug related activities. Id. at
1985.)
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1985 (2015).
 Id. at 1986.
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lead to the conviction are not meant to be reviewed by the
immigration courts, who instead use a categorical approach to focus
on the legal question of what was established by the conviction.
Under Paulus, Mellouli would not be a candidate for deportation
because, in spite of the category of his conviction, the act was not
criminalized under federal law. The BIA used the rationale that
any drug paraphernalia conviction, regardless of whether it is defined
by § 802, should be considered a removable offense, even if mere
possession of the substance is not. The Court clarified that the BIA
used a conflicting interpretation of §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) than what
Congress must have intended, causing even minor drug offenses to
be treated as harshly as drug distributing or trade offenses. The
BIA’s interpretation that “an alien is not removable for possessing a
substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for
using a sock to contain that substance” made no sense to the Court.
The Court, therefore, denied deference to the BIA under the Chevron
doctrine.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s conclusion and added the
reasoning that a conviction for paraphernalia possession under a
state’s law “categorically relates to a federally controlled substance”
as long as there is ‘“nearly a complete overlap’ between the drugs
controlled under state and federal law.” There was a heavy reliance
on the statute’s use of the term “relating to” when determining if a
drug offence in a state could be used for removal under federal law.
Because this term is understandably vague, the Court felt that it was
necessary to narrow the interpretation of the phrase. The Court
held that §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)’s meaning should be limited for removal
purposes to substances defined in §802 and rejected the notion that

 Id. (The lack of review is due to the risk of burdening the system and
establishing fairness and predictability in the immigration courts.)
 Id. at 1987-88 (citing Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1965)).
 Id. at 1988; The BIA relied on the reasoning in Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25
I. & N. Dec. 118 (2009).
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980,1989 (2015).
 Id.
 Id.
 Id. at 1990.
 Id.
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any offense related to drugs or drug paraphernalia could lead to
deportation of an alien.
Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Alito joined in the dissent. The dissent argued that the
court rejected the interpretations of §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) given by the
BIA and the Eighth Circuit but it did not offer its own new
interpretation. Justices Thomas and Alito argued that the statute’s
language supports the argument “that the overlap between state and
federal drug schedules supports the removal of aliens convicted of
any drug crime, not just paraphernalia offenses.” This would mean
that the term “referring to” would modify the meaning of what laws
and regulations are considered instead of modifying the violations
that would qualify for deportation. The Government in the case
argued that overlap between state and federal law allows enough
connection to qualify an alien for deportation for any crime under
state law that relates to the federal law even if not defined by federal
law.
The dissent criticizes the court for not answering the question of
what “relates” to federal law under the statute. A complete overlap
between the laws may not be needed between what substances are
controlled under state and federal law, but the dissent argues that
enough of an overlap should mean that violation of the state law
makes an alien removable even if their actual offense is not defined
under the federal statute. Therefore, the dissent concludes that the
broader interpretation of the federal statute is necessary and that
Mellouli was appropriately deported. 



Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1991 (2015).
Id.
 Id.
 Id.
 Id.
 Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1992 (2015).
 Id. at 1993.
 Id. at 1995.
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Impact
This case has a narrowing affect on the meaning of
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i). This has caused the termination or reversal of
cases being judged on similar facts and reasoning in immigration
courts.  Future cases involving aliens convicted of state drug
paraphernalia offenses will be less likely to lead to deportation of the
aliens. Attorneys with non-U.S. citizen clients facing state drug
charges will have to consider whether the state definition of a
controlled substance includes drugs or paraphernalia not included in
the federal law in order to give effective representation. 
Michigan v. E.P.A.,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 192 L. Ed. 2d 674 (2015)
Synopsis
The Clean Air Act created regulatory programs to control the
pollution sent into the air by factories and refineries.  It was
amended in 1990 to establish the National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants Program in order to address power plants
and the air pollution they cause.  The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) interpreted the Clean Air Act to require it to consider
regulation of power plants where it is “appropriate and necessary,”
but disregarded consideration of the cost of the regulation because
the Act did not specifically require the EPA to consider cost. 
Twenty-three states sought the EPA’s regulations to be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit Court, challenging the EPA’s
refusal to consider the large cost estimated under the program. The
District and Appellate courts found in favor of the EPA, and allowed


Michael Z. Goldman, The Real World Consequences of Mellouli v. Lynch,

CRIMMIGRATION: THE INTERSECTION OF CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION LAW (Jan.

10, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/06/02/the-real-worldconsequences-of-mellouli-v-lynch/
 Id.
 Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671q).
 Id.
 Id.
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it to not consider costs when passing regulations for power plant air
pollution. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case in
favor of the States because the EPA had been unreasonable in not
considering the cost of its regulations; therefore it was not granted
deference under Chevron. 
Background
In order to reduce the air pollution caused by factories and
refineries in the United States, the government passed the Clean Air
Act. This Act established regulatory programs in order to control
the air pollution caused by such stationary sources and moving
sources like cars and airplanes. The National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program was one of the programs in the
Act, established in its current form in the 1990 amendments, and is
focused on regulating the stationary sources of emissions of more
than 180 specific pollutants.
The way the program applies to a
source depends on how much pollution the stationary source emits. 
Congress then established a unique process in order to determine
whether and how to apply these programs to power plants.  The
EPA was instructed to perform a study to determine the likely
hazards to pubic heath after applying the guidelines of the Act, then,
if the agency determines that regulation is “appropriate and
necessary,” the EPA may regulate power plants according to the
Act.  The EPA concluded in 2000 that it was appropriate and
necessary to regulate power plants based on their emissions and



Id. at 2712 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
Id. at 2704.
Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015)..
Id.
 Id. If a source emits more than ten tons of a specific pollutant or twenty-five
tons of a mix of pollutants in a year, it is considered a major source of pollutants
and must be regulated by the EPA. However, stationary sources that emit less
pollutants but have the risk of causing damage to human health or the environment
are called area sources and must also be regulated by the EPA. Id. at 2705.
 Id. at 2705.
 Id.
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inadequacies in the Act. This conclusion was later confirmed in
2012.  However, the EPA indicated that the cost of regulation
“should not be considered” in deciding whether power plants should
be regulated.  The Agency estimated that the benefits of reducing
the air pollutants of power plants would be worth around four to six
million dollars a year, but the costs of the programs under their
proposed regulations would be $9.6 billion for the power plants. 
The District and Appellate courts found in favor of the EPA,
allowing it to not consider costs when passing regulations for power
plant air pollution. 
Analysis and Ruling
Congress laid out specific criteria for the EPA to use to determine
if other sources of pollutants would be included in the program, but
the power plants were treated differently. Congress asked the EPA
to regulate power plants only if it found that regulation was
“appropriate and necessary” with no specific guidance as to what
factors to consider. The phrase “appropriate and necessary” may
be broad and up to interpretation, but the Court indicated that a
federal agency may not fail to consider such an important aspect as
cost. The Court conceded that there are situations in which cost is
not a necessary consideration, but that it is not rational, much less
appropriate, to enact regulations that cost billions of dollars for such
a small amount of estimated benefit.  It is common practice for
Agencies to consider cost; therefore, not considering cost would be
unusual when deciding whether to impose regulations.  Under
Chevron deference, agencies are able to choose a reasonable


Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015).
Id.
 Id. at 2706. The regulatory impact analysis took other pollutants not on the
EPA’s list and considered the lowering of these emissions when it gave its
estimated benefit value of $37-90 billion. Id.
 Id.
Id. at 2707.
Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
Id
 Id.
 Id.
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interpretation of ambiguous or vague statutes and courts respect that
reasonable interpretation when considering the agency’s liability or
actions.  However, the Court felt that, since other parts of the Clean
Air Act discuss cost, that the purposeful disregard of that factor in
consideration was not reasonable. 
Justice Thomas Concurring
Judge Thomas concurred specifically with the Court’s
interpretation and implementation of the Chevron deference
precedent.  He agreed that the interpretation of Congress’s request
that the EPA determine if power plant regulation was “appropriate
and necessary” meant that the EPA was not meant to consider
whether the cost of the regulation was unreasonable.  The limitation
of the Chevron deference test was, to Justice Thomas, an extremely
positive outcome of the ruling.  He noted that the Chevron
deference should not allow federal agencies to act in an irresponsible
manner when interpreting vague statutes.
Justice Kagen Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined in
the dissent. The dissent argued that the EPA took many factors into
consideration. The EPA estimated that the benefit, according to the
list of pollutants it usually used, was worth $4 to $6 million but those
amounts were shifted to a benefit worth $80 billion including the
ability to prevent approximately 11,000 fewer premature deaths.
The basic argument is that the EPA only must take the emissions in
consideration to determine the appropriateness or necessity of the
regulation and only after that analysis does the EPA consider the cost


Id. at 2708.
Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708 (2015).
 Id.
 Id.
 Id.
Id.
Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2715 (2015).
Id.
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benefit analysis. The dissent notes that cost was considered after
the need for regulation as determined and that the EPA would have
taken cost into account when drafting said regulation.
Impact
This case limited the scope of the Chevron deference given to
federal agencies when interpreting ambiguous statutes. The cost and
burden of regulations should be considered as a factor in a majority
of situations as is customary in determining whether regulations are
necessary. In this way, the reasonableness factor in the deference test
has been affirmed and elevated in its consideration by the court.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,
799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015)
Synopsis
In 2005, the FTC began pursuing liability of companies with
either inadequate cyber security to protect consumer’s data against
hackers or companies that made false statements about their level of
security. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. was the target of hackers
three times in 2008 and 2009. The hackers successfully accessed
personal information of approximately 619,000 consumers and
managed to cause $10.6 million in fraud loss. The district court
denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, and the appeal was heard on
two issues to show a failure to state a claim. The issues raised



Id.
Id.
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
 Id. Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, LLC,
Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc., and Wyndham Worldwide Corp were all
defendants in the case and are all referred to under the name “Wyndham” in the
case.
 Id.
 Id.
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were the FTC’s authority to regulate cyber security under 15
U.S.C.S. §45(a) or (n)’s unfairness prong, and, regardless of the
authority, whether Wyndham had had fair notice that its security
precautions were inadequate under FTC guidelines. The appellate
court affirmed the district court’s ruling against the motion to
dismiss.
Background
The Federal Trade Commission Act was established in 1914,
codified as 15 U.S.C. §45(a), prohibiting unfair business practices or
“methods of competition in commerce.” The 1994 amendments
codified §45(n), a three-step policy that had developed over the
decades of how to judge whether a practice was indeed unfair.
The development of cyber crime and reasonable industry standards
for cyber security in business practices lead the FTC to begin filing
cases against companies for not protecting consumers and for falsely
misleading consumers regarding the company’s level of security in
2005. In 2008 and 2009, the computer systems of Wyndham
Worldwide Corporation were hacked on three separate occasions.
The personal information of approximately 619,000 consumers was
accessed and compromised. The cyber thieves successfully
caused $10.6 million in fraud loss. The FTC filed suit against
Wyndham for violations of §45(a) in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona in June of 2012. The case was then transferred
to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey where


Id.
F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
 Id. at 243.
 Id.
 Id. at 240.
 Id. Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, LLC,
Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc, and Wyndham Worldwide Corp were all
defendants in the case and are all referred to under the name “Wyndham” in the
case.
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
 Id.
 Id. at 242.
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Wyndham filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The motion
to dismiss was denied, but the court certified the decision on the
claim of unfairness for interlocutory appeal.
Analysis and Ruling
FTC’s Regulatory Authority Under §45(a) or (n)
The FTC has the ability to pursue cases against companies for
unfair business practices under §45(a). The unfairness test in
§45(n) has three factors: (1) substantial injury to consumers, (2)
which could not be avoided by consumers and (3) is not outweighed
by benefits. The statute further instructs the FTC to consider
established public policies. Wyndham claims that all three factors
are necessary but not adequate by themselves, and that other
requirements were necessary to be met in order for Wyndham to be
liable. The Court agreed that the three-factor test may be
necessary but not independently sufficient; however, the Court was
not persuaded by the alternatives Wyndham proposed. It determined
that the FTC had authority to regulate unfair practices of the nature in
the case.
Fair Notice
Wyndham next made the claim that it lacked fair notice of the
law. It claimed that it acted with the understanding that it needed
ascertainable certainty of the FTC’s security standards. Wyndham
had the requisite notice in order to put security measures in place,



Id.
Id.
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2015).
 Id. at 244.
 Id.
 Id.
 Id.
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2015).
 Id.
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especially after the first instance of security breach. Even though
the standard of notice does not need to be as high in civil cases, as in
criminal cases. The Court determined that Wyndham could not claim
that it lacked fair notice.
Impact
This case affirmed the FTC’s authority to pursue cases against
companies; however, the three-factor test for unfair practices may be
expanded in the future. The issue of fair notice was still muddled by
the case because Wyndham did not sufficiently argue the claim for
fair notice. Wyndham claimed that there is no FTC interpretation of
§45(a) or (n) that the court must defer to, and that the Court must
interpret the statute itself and apply it to Wyndham’s conduct in the
first instance. Wyndham was not able to argue that it needed to
know the standards with ascertainable certainty—it could only claim
that it did not have fair notice of the meaning of the statute, which it
did not do sufficiently.
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
799 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2015).
Synopsis
A class action lawsuit was brought against JP Morgan Chase
Bank for failing to detect a Ponzi scheme. Chase claimed that a
portion of the documents the plaintiffs requested was shielded from
discovery. A magistrate judge reviewed the disputed documents
and concluded that a “vast majority” was not shielded from discovery
under and statute or regulation.
Chase’s request for an
interlocutory appeal was denied by the district court, so Chase


Id. at 250.
Id. at 258.
 Id. at 259.
 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 240, 259 (3d Cir. 2015).
 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2015).
 Id.
 Id. at 38.
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initiated a mandamus proceeding to force the district court to declare
fifty-five pages of the discovery documents shielded under the Bank
Secrecy Act. The appellate court did a de novo review of the
documents in camera. The court determined that the writ of
mandamus was denied due to Chase’s failure to show clear
entitlement to the relief sought.
Background
The plaintiffs in the case alleged that a Chase customer had used
his accounts with the bank and a bank acquired by chase in order to
run a Ponzi scheme. A putative class action was brought against
the bank for failure to detect and stop the Ponzi scheme. The
plaintiffs managed to acquire a large collection of records from
Chase in preparation for litigation. There was a dispute between
Chase and the plaintiffs regarding whether the Bank Secrecy Act and
similar regulations protected some of the documents from
discovery. Notification of the dispute was sent to the Director of
the Litigation Division for the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) but only the OCC filed an amicus brief in the district court
with a review of the legal principles. However, the OCC refused
to review the documents so a magistrate judge reviewed the
documents in camera. The district court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs and Chase filed a motion for mandamus proceeding hoping
the appellate court would declare that the fifty-five pages of
documents from discovery were shielded from discovery through the
Bank Secrecy Act and other regulations.



Id. at 38. The Bank Secrecy Act is codified as 31 USC § 5318(g). Id. at 37.
Id.
 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2015).
 Id. at 38
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 Id.
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 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 2015).
 Id.
 Id.




544



      





Analysis and Ruling
In order to qualify for mandamus, the petitioner must prove that
“there is a clear entitlement to the relief requested and that
irreparable harm will likely occur if the writ is withheld.” There
are high standards for a writ of mandamus to be granted as it may not
be a substitute for appeal and the threat of injury must be blatant.
The “clear entitlement prong of the mandamus standard” calls for the
court’s prudent analysis of the Bank Secrecy Act and related
regulations, which pertain to the confidentiality of suspicious activity
reports (SARs). Although there is clear provision for confidentiality
of certain documents and information, one of the regulations under
the Act specifies that “the regulation should not be construed as
prohibiting . . . [t]he disclosure . . . of . . . [t]he underlying facts,
transactions, and documents upon which a SAR is based.” The
court also notes that case law has affirmed the rights of evidentiary
privilege and unqualified discovery. In the end, the documents
Chase wanted shielded did not meet the standards necessary for a
writ of mandamus under the Act or any of the regulations. Chase still
had less severe options in order to continue to seek protection for the
documents, but the writ was denied. Chase’s additional motion for
sanction against the plaintiff’s council was also denied and the
parties’ motion to file a joint supplemental appendix was granted.
Impact
The protection of the right of discovery is fundamental to the
U.S. judicial system. Although the protection of privileged and
confidential information is extremely valuable, courts cannot be
overbroad in its protections at the detriment of those who have been
wronged or those wrongfully accused. The court could not set the


Id.
Id. at 39.
 In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2015). (citing 12
C.F.R. §21.11(k)(1)(ii)(A)(2)).
 Id. at 44.
 Id. at 45.
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precedent that a writ of mandamus could be used as a substitute for
an appeal when an appeal and other methods of protection are
available.
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC,
799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015)
Synopsis
The designers at Varsity Brands Inc. (Varsity) created designs for
cheerleading uniforms, which it submitted to the Copyright Office.
Varsity had five registered copyrights that it claimed Star Athletica,
LLC (Star) was violating by marketing similar designs. Varsity
brought suit against Star for violation of the Copyright Act and
Tennessee state-law pertaining to copyright and competition. The
district court ruled in favor of Star granting summary judgment on all
federal matters regarding the Copyright Act and then dismissing the
state-law claims without prejudice. The Court analyzed the
separability of the designs from their utilitarian function and
determined that the designed were copyrightable. The Court
remanded the case, allowed the state law claim to be reassessed, and
allowed Varsity to adjust its claim to address the diversity
jurisdiction that allowed the federal court jurisdiction.
Background
The design team at Varsity created designs for their cheerleading
sportswear claimed that it held five copyrights filed with the
Copyright Office in accordance to the Copyright Act. The designs
were made without looking at the functionality of the product, but



Id.
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2015).
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 Id. at 471.
 Id. at 475.
 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015).
 Id. 474-75 (6th Cir. 2015); 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.




546



      





consisted of the arrangements and positions of shapes and colors.
Star also produced uniforms for cheerleading. Varsity claims that
Star has violated its five copyrights by marketing outfits of similar
design and brought suit under the Copyright Act and Tennessee’s
laws against “unfair competition, inducement of breach of contract,
inducement of breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy.”
Star denied the charges and brought counterclaims against Varsity
misleading representations to the Copyright Office. Both parties
Star claimed that Varsity’s
moved for summary judgment.
copyrights were invalid because (1) the designs are for useful items
and are therefore not copyrightable and (2) the graphic, pictorial
and/or sculptural were not separable from the uniform thus are also
not copyrightable. Varsity claimed that its copyrights were valid
because (1) the designs were “separable and nonfunctional” and (2)
Star’s actions infringed its copyrights. The district court ruled in
favor of Star and granted summary judgment, dismissing the state
law claims without prejudice.
Analysis and Ruling
In order to prevail on its Copyright infringement claim, Varsity
must show that it owned a valid copyright in the designs and that Star
copied the protectable parts of the work. The first prong of the
test, to establish the validity of a copyright, has five elements:
(1) originality in the author; (2) copyrightability of the subject
matter; (3) a national point of attachment of the work, such as to
permit a claim of copyright; (4) compliance with applicable statutory
formalities; and (5) (if the plaintiff is not the author) a transfer of



Id. at 471.
Id. at 475.
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 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2015).
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rights or other relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as
to constitute the plaintiff as the valid copyright claimant.
The second prong of the test determines whether an infringement
of the copyright occurred, and whether the copied portions of the
material should have been protected under copyright law. Varsity
claims that the district court did not give deference to the Copyright
Office’s decision that the material was protectable under copyright
law, and that the district court used the wrong approach to decide
whether the design was separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
item.
Copyright registration occurs at the discretion of the Copyright
Office. The court must give a presumption of validity in a judicial
proceeding if the Copyright Office has granted a copyright
registration. Once the plaintiff shows that the work was registered
before publication or within five years after publication of the work,
the burden shifts to the defendant who may rebut the presumption by
showing that the copyrights are invalid. The Chevron doctrine
grants deference to executive agencies that Congress delegated the
authority to implement provisions. The Copyright Office was
delegated such responsibilities, but the Court determined that it
should be granted deference under the Skidmore deference more than
the Chevron deference because the delegated power is not to make
law.
The court must determine whether or not the article is useful and
whether the aesthetic designs are separable from the utilitarian
aspects of an item. Separability from the utilitarian aspects of an
item is determined in two ways, by looking at its physical
separability and its conceptual separability. 
The physical


Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2015).
Id.
 Id. at 477.
 Id.
 Id.
 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
 Id. at 479; Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
 Id. at 481.
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separability test is considered along with whether the “pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features of an article are conceptually
separable” because the physical test is limited.  Of the multiple
approaches used by courts, the Court decided upon a hybrid approach
used by the Second and Fourth Circuits, which determined that the
decorative elements of clothing are separable from the function of a
garment. 
The Sixth Circuit’s approach to identify pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works was determined to be the best
approach.  This approach is made up of asking multiple questions
that are derived from the Copyright Act.  These include what the
utilitarian aspect of the item is, whether an individual viewing the
design can identify the “‘pictorial, graphic or sculptural features’
‘separately from the utilitarian aspect of the useful article,’” and
whether those features of the design can exist independently of the
utilitarian aspects of the item.  The court determined that, because
Varsity’s designs were more similar to fabric designs than dress
designs, they are protectable subject matter under the Copyright
Act.  Therefore, summary judgment was entered in Varsity’s favor
on the issue of copyright protectability.
The Court answered five questions to determine whether
Varsity’s designs were protectable. First, the Court determined that
Varsity’s designed are “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural” because they
are two-dimensional works of art.
Second, the designs are for
useful articles because they are designs for cheerleading uniforms.
Third, The Court rejected Star’s arguments for the purported
utilitarian aspect of a cheerleading uniform and found it to be an
impermissible factor.
The Court also denied that the decorative
aspects of a cheerleading outfit are a part of the utilitarian aspect of
the garment because it is well established that fabric designs are
 

Id. at 482.
Id. at 487.
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 Id. at 488.
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copyrightable.  The fourth question was whether the pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural aspects of the garments could be identified
separately from the utilitarian aspects of covering the body, wicking
away moisture, and permitting free body movement.  The Court
determined that the designs could be separately identified because a
plain white cheerleading outfit could complete the same functions
separate from the graphic designs.  Question five was whether the
“arrangement of stripes, chevrons, color blocks, and zigzags” could
exist independently of the useful aspects of the uniform. The court
reasoned that they were separable and copyrightable because the
designs could be transferred to other items of clothing and were not
solely tied to the cheerleading uniform.
The district court’s dismissal of the state law claims was based on
the principle that a district court may refuse to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction on state-law claims if the federal questions over which it
has jurisdiction have been dismissed.  The court vacated the
district court’s dismissal of the state-law claims for two reasons: (1)
there was still a federal claim because the court held that Varsity’s
designs are copyrightable graphic work, and (2) Varsity should have
the opportunity to amend its complaint to satisfy the diversity
jurisdiction requirements.  Therefore, Varsity was granted the
ability to bring the state claims again when the case was remanded.
Impact
The court used this case to identify what it considered the best
approach to determine the validity of a copyrightable design for
garments with a utilitarian aspect. This ruling will create the ability
to copyright uniforms, costumes, and other useful garments, thus
precluding them from being widely copied. This protects designers
and encourages ingenuity and competition.

 

Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
  Id.
  Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 493 (6th Cir. 2015).
  Id. (The second reason is due to Star’s assertion that Varsity did not meet
diversity jurisdiction because they did not state an amount in controversy or that
the parties were diverse it its complaint.)
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De Niz Robles v. Lynch,
803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015)
Synopsis
The court made a ruling in Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales
(Padilla–Caldera I ), 426 F.3d 1294, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2005) which
was overruled by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued In
re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007).  The ruling of
Briones was applied retroactively to a petition by Mr. De Niz Robles
for an adjustment of his citizenship status even though his application
was submitted relying on the ruling in Padilla-Caldera I.  The
question before the court was whether an executive agency, with
delegated legislative policy making authority, can overrule a rule that
a judicial proceeding established.
Under Chevron, step two and
Brand X, if a “statutory scheme administered by an executive
agency” is ambiguous then the court must assume that Congress has
delegated decision making to the agency and defer to the agencies
policy choices even if they overrule precedent.
These rules
applied to the law when Mr. De Niz Robles’s application was denied
because he was found inapplicable for adjustment of his status under
§§1255(i)(2)(A) and 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).
After analysis of the
Constitution, views on retroactivity and the Bowen case, the Court
focused on the Stewart Capital factors. The same conclusion was
reached with every test, that retroactivity does not apply, so the
petition for review was granted and the case was remanded back to
the BIA for proceedings consistent with the decision.
Background
The first statute passed that affected the case was the §1255(i),
which gives the Attorney General the ability to change the status of
illegal immigrants and grant them lawful residency.  The second
 

De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1167.
These statutes will be further explained in the description of the analysis.
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statute, § 1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I), limits this discretion by clarifying that
those who have entered the US illegally more than once are unable to
receive lawful residency unless they first have a ten-year waiting
period outside of the U.S.  In 2005, the court ruled in Padilla–
Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla–Caldera I ) that §1255 trumped
§1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I).  So, the Attorney General would still be able
to have the discretion to adjust the citizenship status of those who
applied. Relying on this ruling, Mr. De Niz Robles decided to
remain in the US and applied for an adjustment in his status. His
application sat in the process of being reviewed for years when the
BIA passed In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) in which
the BIA ruled that §1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I) was the statute that ruled and
that the Attorney General had no ability to adjust a status and that
this ruling applied retroactively. Therefore, this ruling would be
applied to the applications waiting for status adjustment or
“retroactively.”
The court was bound by the ruling of the executive agency under
an exception define by the “step two” of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and
the National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services (Brand X), 545 U.S. 967 (2005) case. Together, these cases
have created the rule that, “if a statutory scheme administered by an
executive agency is ‘ambiguous’” the court must assume that
Congress has delegated the ability to make policy decisions to the
agency and requires the court to “defer to the agency's policy
choice,” even if it overrules “preexisting and governing statutory
interpretation” by the court.  The BIA finally ruled on Mr. De Niz
Robles’s application in 2013, denying his application based on the In
re Briones ruling.  Mr. De Niz Robles appealed the denial leading
to the case at hand. 

 

Id.
Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir.) amended and
superseded on reh'g, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2005) disapproved in later appeal
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Analysis and Ruling
The question before the court was whether a ruling made by an
executive agency could be applied retroactively.  The BIA denied
that there is any retroactivity because the ruling on Mr. De Niz
Robles’s application was far after its decision in In re Briones.
Robles claimed that he had filed the petition in 2005 in reliance on
the law at the time and he could have been out of the country for the
necessary ten years if he had known to rely on §1255; therefore, the
new law was applied to actions taken before its creation.
The Constitution is clear that the laws passed by Congress are
prospective and cannot be retroactive under the principles of due
process and equal protection unless they are expressly prescribed as
being retroactive. Judicial decisions, however, are presumptively
allowed to be retroactive under the Constitution because they are
rulings on past events. Yet, the retroactivity of rulings by
executive agencies was unclear. The court concludes that the
delegation of powers to the agency came from a legislative source
and therefore must be treated as prospective. The Court in
Bowen held that an executive agency’s rulings should only be
prospective unless allowed retroactivity by Congress. The case
analyzed how rule two in Chevron and Brand X can be reconciled
with the decision against retroactivity. The agency holds a judicial
proceeding complete with briefs and arguments, which seems to
indicate that a ruling would be treated like a judicial ruling complete
with retroactivity because the agency is not changing a law as much
as clarifying and interpreting a law’s meaning. However, the
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Court clarifies that step two in Chevron applies when an executive
agency uses the ambiguity of a law to write new laws under its
Therefore, Bowen supports the Court’s
delegated powers.
conclusion that there is no retroactivity because the acts of the BIA
are a part of legislative rather than judicial proceedings, thus are
prospective in effect.
However, the Court did allow for the
retroactivity of an executive agency’s decisions to be judged on a
case-by-case basis to allow for some flexibility.
A five-factor balancing test was established in the case Stewart
Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir.1983). The
Stewart Capital factors are for application on a case-by-case basis.
The first factor is whether the case was one of first impression, which
is irrelevant in this case. The second factor asks whether the
action or ruling of the executive agency is a sudden divergence from
“well established practice” or if it is only trying to “fill a void in an
unsettled area of the law.” The third factor requires the court to
ask whether and to what extent the party affected by the new ruling
relied on a former law or ruling. The fourth asks how much of a
burden retroactive application of the agency’s decision would create
for the petitioner. Lastly, the fifth factor asks whether the agency's
interest in retroactivity is more valuable.
The Court concluded that the BIA's application of Briones to Mr.
De Niz Robles’s application was retroactive. This meant that
those who had relied on the law as it was when they applied for
change in their citizenship status, like Mr. De Niz Robles, were
disadvantaged because they had already given up years towards their
other option. The Court valued the ability for the people to be able
to rely on laws and for there to be constancy and dependence on the
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way the law would be applied.
It therefore found that the
“principles underlying the law of retroactivity” were not in support of
this action.
The petition for review of Mr. De Niz Roble’s
application was granted and the case was remanded to the BIA for
further proceedings consistent with that decision.
Impact
This case excited immigration attorneys because it officially
indicated that what the BIA had done was, in fact, retroactive
application of its ruling. It further confirmed that the policies against
retroactivity and in favor of reliability in the law would be enforced
even against government agencies. This meant that rulings of the
BIA could be rejected or appealed based on retroactivity in
application of law. Therefore, the immigrants who were caught
between the two conflicting laws and relying on the one that allowed
them ability to petition for status adjustment were allowed to
continue to be applicable for status adjustment so long as their
application was within a certain time around the newest ruling.
This will likely cause a small influx of cases to be brought by those
who were denied status adjustment through the retroactive
application of the BIA’s ruling.
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